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Editorial Note

INTEREST in "realism", "nominalism", etc., has been reawakened among theologians by the suggestion that the thinking of the Reformers was affected in important ways by the prevalence of the philosophical notions of the late middle ages, and we have been asked whether we could publish some articles which would throw light on this question. The article by Mr Carré deals with the philosophical background, whereas that by Dr Haegglund from a theological point of view discusses whether or to what extent Luther was a nominalist.

The Debate over Universals

"INTELLECTUS noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium." Our mind has direct knowledge only of universals. Discussions concerning the nature of universals and how we know them were a dominant feature of the philosophical debates of the Middle Ages. The disputes between realists, moderate realists, conceptualists and nominalists often became acute; and after centuries of intense controversy and reflection, solutions to the problems of universals became extremely subtle and complicated. Scholars of the Renaissance period turned away with contempt from the nice distinctions of the schools, and Erasmus declared that it would require the eyes of a lynx to perceive universals and other entities of the philosophers. In England there was a striking revival of interest in these questions during the early 18th century owing to the lively discussions of Locke and Berkeley. In recent years the problems of universals have attracted considerable attention among British philosophers.

What are universals and what are the main problems to which they have given rise in the history of thought? What are the characteristic positions of the various groups, the realists, the nominalists and the rest? In attempting to answer these questions, I will touch first on the simple meaning of the technical term, universal; I will then indicate what questions philosophers ask about universals and why these questions are important; and, finally, I will describe briefly the positions of some of the leading schools of thought in this field of philosophy.

Most of the words we use in communicating with one another, in speech or writing, are general words. Indeed, if we exclude proper

names, such as William Shakespeare and Canterbury, which refer to one particular thing or person, nearly all the words we use and nearly all the words in the dictionary are general words. In speaking of "a garden" or of "shaking hands" we can make ourselves understood without having to point at a particular garden or demonstrate the action of shaking hands, for these words carry general meaning. The word "garden" indicates all objects of that *kind*. Language is an ingenious symbolism by which a vast range of actions or objects can be mentally passed from one person to others, and this feat is made possible by the use of general words. General words can be classified in many ways; it will be sufficient here to point to two distinctions. Words do not only refer to some kind of thing; they also express feelings, they persuade, threaten, command, promise and have many other uses beside that of giving information. Philosophers in the past have been chiefly interested in words that referred to something, words such as novel, fog, puppy; their concentration upon such words is now recognized as unfortunate. The further distinction which may be made here concerns general descriptive words. Words can describe many degrees of generality. A medieval instance of such degrees of generality is man, animal, being. Words that are highly general are responsibility, similarity, ownership, loveliness.

The general object or quality, the *kind* of thing, is what philosophers mean by a universal. The word "novel" is a universal, referring to novel in general, of which *The Antiquary* is an instance. Mr Scrooge's behaviour is an example of stinginess in general. The colour of the curtains and the bookcase manifests the universal, brown.

From the time of the Greeks to the present day philosophers have asked many questions about universals, of which the following are typical. To what does a word signifying a universal refer? Do universals show that the world contains general features as well as particular things? Or are the general features due to the activity of the mind, fabricating abstractions? If so, what is the process by which universals are formed? If universals exist in the world, independently of our mental activity, how are they related to particular things? Which are the fundamental features of the world, universals or particulars? These questions show that inquiries about universals are concerned with primary characteristics of human understanding and the world. The questions invite us to examine how far our thinking reproduces the actual structure of things; problems relating to universals lead to more ultimate problems concerning knowledge and reality. The scholastic philosophers inherited the problems of universals obliquely from the writing of Plato and Aristotle, but doctrines relating to universals were quickly applied to the governing beliefs of Christian theology, and became cardinal part of the rational defence of faith, as well as fundamental features of human knowledge. Further, owing principally to the work of Plato, philosophical inquiry pursued certain dominant and comprehensive classes of universals; moral universals, such as goodness, justice, courage; aesthetic universals, such as beauty, harmony; and scientific universals, such as

essential nature, cause, mathematical form. These investigations manifestly bear upon central principles of human experience.

Let us now glance at some of the main theories of universals. A famous theory is that words such as justice, triangularity, humanity, represent pervasive qualities of the world. They are features of the structure of reality, existing independently of our minds. We do not construct these general objects, we discover them, either by analysis or by intuition. An extreme form of the theory holds that such universals exist apart from the particular things which we see and touch, or apart from particular actions, and that the particular things or actions possess genuine reality only in so far as they share in the universal modes of being. A modified form of this *realist* theory is that universals are common properties of things, appearing in a number of things. Triangularity does not exist apart from triangles, nor equinity apart from horses. Nevertheless, the theory holds universals to be essential features of things. Things are what they are in virtue of the universal nature in them. These theories, and more particularly the latter, are plausible, and a great deal of discussion proceeds on the assumption that they are true. For instance, a recent important book on social and political theory considers the principles of liberty, equality and justice, seeks to distinguish the state from society, and examines the relation of the functions of government to the rights of individuals. All these inquiries appear to assume the existence of independent, permanent, self-identical universals, equality, the state, individual, and the rest, which can be discovered and clearly understood by examining the true meaning of these words. The true nature of liberty or of equality is something that can be found by thought; it is not something which is fashioned by our minds. A large amount of debate in philosophy, theology, politics and other fields of thought proceeds on this realist basis. Accordingly, the criticism of these beliefs by philosophers and the assertion of other theories of universals are matters of wide interest.

Philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries, especially the empirical followers of Boyle and Locke, revolted from the realism of the scholastic era. They advocated various modes of *conceptualism*, the general character of which I will touch on in a moment. For a few philosophers, among whom Roscelin in the 11th century and Hobbes in the 17th may be mentioned, the general *names* we impose on groups of things, each member of which is individual and distinct, are alone universal. This is *nominalism*. In its extreme form it seems an absurd theory, for we do not call a range of things or qualities, say plum or brown, by the same name in a completely arbitrary way, changing the name whenever we like; we call things by the same name in virtue of some likeness which we notice in a series of things. But this recognition of certain features that are common to a group of particular things need not lead us back to realism. To say that we call a group of particular things "plums" or "novels" in virtue of certain ways in which particular plums and novels resemble other particular plums and novels, is not the same as saying that there is one general thing, a permanent and determinate universal, which is

embodied in the particular things. Things are like one another in many different ways and they can be classified in groups according to the purpose we have in hand. Plums can be grouped in different ways for the purposes of the fruiterer, the agriculturalist, the botanist and the painter. There is no basic universal plum. Further, the similarities in virtue of which we call a number of things by the same name are often imprecise and elastic. General words such as chair, bed, town, cup, money, house (apart from metaphorical uses) can be extended beyond the usual reference. The similarity is loose, an affair of practical convenience, and whether we are to call a piece of rock a chair, or *Aurora Leigh* a novel, is a matter of choice. Things must possess *some* likeness to be called by the same name, but where the likeness ends is for us to decide. We are not committed, on this theory, to the position of that eminent philosopher, Humpty Dumpty, for whom a word means just what one chooses it to mean. For the ways in which things are like one another, so as to allow us to classify them under one name, are not invented by us but noticed or discovered. The likenesses and the differences are actually there.

Philosophers of the classical school of British empiricism would agree that universals depend upon noticing resemblances between things; indeed, all theories of universals must recognize, as a preliminary condition, that particular things are like one another in various ways. But Locke and his disciples, who are usually described as conceptualists, held that universals are the products of our minds. General ideas, house or youthfulness, represent no general objects in nature. General ideas are fabricated by the mind, the process being abstraction, in which the resemblances are attended to apart from the differences. According to Locke, when children form the general idea of man they "only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all". The important point in this conceptualism, however, is not its account of abstraction, which is now seen to be very defective, but its denial of any general features in things. General ideas are the inventions and creatures of the understanding and correspond to nothing existing in the world. The theory expresses a recoil from realism, but the recoil carries Locke and his followers too far towards nominalism. Universals are fashioned by language. A general word, brown or insect, stands for individual things, so far as they are alike in certain respects, but in nature there are only individual things. The resemblances are abstractions, not realities. There are many difficulties in this famous theory, which has been reproduced in more refined shapes in recent times. The main difficulty is that it invites a subjective view of knowledge. If the general features of things are invented by our minds they do not reveal any truths about the world, and Locke was well aware of this consequence when he declared that there could be "no science of bodies"; that is to say, there is no knowledge of the real nature of objects. Later philosophers attempted in various ways to overcome the embarrassments to which the notion of abstract ideas, behaving like a veil or fog between us and the actual world, gave rise.

Modern discussions have tried to avoid the difficulties which appear in the older doctrines. On the whole recent accounts of universals lean towards nominalism in so far as they maintain that universals are products of linguistic usage. They lean towards realism in asserting that common properties are actual properties of things. They deny that universals are any sort of things. When we speak of raspberries or machines or youthfulness we refer to many individual things which have points in common, but the common points are not further objects beside the individual things. They are indeed found in the world of objects. The world contains repeated qualities and events, some of which appear identical, others are more or less like one another. In virtue of these recurrences and similarities we are able to classify, in our general words, what we observe and handle, in a number of useful ways, each displaying some aspect of the world. Modern philosophers have dwelt upon relations as well as upon qualities; and they have distinguished various modes of resemblance which were indiscriminately lumped together in the classical theories. I cannot describe these important refinements here. On the one hand, then, universals are manifold similarities which we can trace as we will in the world; on the other hand, they are ways of grouping and arranging our experience. The similarities and repetitions that we notice engender habits of language and thought, ranging from a childish level to the technical classifications of the sciences and to the wide universals of philosophy. And, of course, there are freely selected, imaginative constructions, the creations of art. Here the element of truth in the conceptualist theory becomes apparent. This repudiation of the old but engrained realism has striking consequences in every province of inquiry. The search for the intrinsic meaning of a word or for the essential nature of a thing is declared to be an unprofitable pursuit. There are no final and absolute meanings of table, fever, freedom, evil or explanation, unless we introduce a definition for some scientific purpose. Neither are there any true meanings or fundamental natures or universal characters of the state, sin, justice, the self, democracy, capitalism, mechanism, matter and hundreds of other topics. The meaning of a general word is not identical with a single universal, which is independent of any context. The meaning of universals are related to contexts, cultural, historical and sometimes personal; to grasp their meaning is to understand the frame of reference in which they are being used. Accordingly, assertions about science in general, or theology, or culture, or France may fall into the errors of realism; and discussions about *the* something, such as the mind, the investor, the Church, the theory of art may err in the same way.

From this point of view the ancient questions about *genera* and *species* are not questions which can usefully be asked at all. The ancient problem was "What are universals?" It asked, what sort of entities are signified by the words animal, man, body? Such questions presuppose that these words do refer to entities, kinds of things, real identities. And, presuming that they do so, we can, it is thought, ask "What *is* nationality, music, authority and truth?" But general terms

are not the names of any kinds of things, and the problem is wrongly posed. The problem is rather, "How are general words effectively used?" The problem cannot be pursued here, but it is manifest that the discussion of it leads us to reflect on far-reaching questions of language, thought and existence, and the bearing of realism upon religious belief and theology cannot be ignored.

MEYRICK H. CARRÉ.

Was Luther a Nominalist?[1]

THE problem of the relation between Luther and the tradition which derives its name from William of Occam[2] has in our time acquired a new interest. Certain Roman Catholic critics are inclined to ascribe the Reformer's heretical ideas to nominalist influences. According to them nominalism bears within itself a ferment of dissolution; it rejects in a radical manner the fundamental presuppositions of the whole scholastic theology. Is such a view based on an accurate representation of nominalism? This is a question which we cannot answer within the limits of the present article. Much can be said in favour of the contention; but it must not be forgotten that the theologians who may be regarded as Luther's masters were not in any marked degree innovators. In addition to William of Occam himself, there were Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly and above all Gabriel Biel, professor at Tübingen, whom his contemporaries regarded as a great theologian. They all kept rigorously within the framework fixed by the Church; though their school met with some opposition at the outset, it ended by becoming dominant in a whole chain of universities that were among the most influential of the period.

There are other reasons as well that make a study of the relations of Luther with occamism highly interesting. In spite of the extensive work that has been done on Luther's theology during recent decades, this particular topic has received hardly any attention. No doubt that is partly owing to practical difficulties in the way of all research into nominalist theology. There are hardly any recent editions of the works of the writers of this school, and their theological method makes it difficult to get a general grasp of their position. But it is worth while, even from a purely historical point of view, to inquire into the connexions between Luther and the occamist tradition. Many of the Reformer's writings make use of nominalist terminology and are so closely bound up with the questions raised by this school that, in some cases, it is impossible to get hold of their meaning unless one is acquainted with their scholastic background.

The best way to approach the subject is to compare those of Luther's writings which depend on the nominalist tradition with the

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[1] This article has been translated, with permission, from the French periodical *Positions Luthériennes*, October 1955 (16 rue Chauchat, Paris IXe).

[2] To designate this tradition we shall use the terms "occamism" and "nominalism" indifferently.

works of the authors to whom he refers. It is no good being content with generalities.

It is chiefly with respect to two matters that Luther's theology has been held to be in accord with that of the occamists; the doctrine of justification, on the one hand, and his conception of the relations between theology and philosophy, on the other. It is on these two questions that we shall concentrate our attention.

I. The Doctrine of Justification

Occamist theology presupposes a double definition of justification. According to the idea of the "regular power" (*potentia ordinata*) of God, justification consists in the gift of his grace that God bestows on the man who has known how to prepare himself for it aright. Grace in this case abolishes sin and sanctifies the man; we are then justified in consequence of a new (inner) condition that grace has created in us. According to the idea of the "absolute power" (*potentia absoluta*) of God, however, the nominalists also conceive of justification as the fact that God declares us righteous solely on the ground that he freely accepts us, without regard to what we bring with us in the way either of inherent grace or of holiness.[1] We may call this the doctrine of *acceptance*. Both these lines of thought must be taken into consideration when a comparison is made between nominalist theology and Luther's. We will first see what his attitude was to the usual occamist doctrine. Then we shall deal with the doctrine of acceptance.

From the very beginning of his polemic against nominalism, Luther takes his stand against the idea that there can be a preparation of man for grace. This does not mean that he attacks the nominalist system just at one particular point. Rather it means that his conception of man and of grace is altogether different from that of the nominalists.

According to occamism, man who is deprived of grace can prepare himself in several ways to receive it. He can, for example, renounce sin and love God above all things. He can also produce a faith that prepares him for grace; he can accept the Christian message when he hears it. These various preparations are summed up in the idea that man ought "to do what is in his power" ("facere quod est in se"—which became a technical expression).

For Luther such a preparation is impossible on the level of human nature. "On the part of man," he says, "nothing precedes grace but an evil disposition, indeed nothing but rebellion against grace."[2] He explains this state of affairs on psychological as well as on theological grounds. In Luther's view the nominalist psychology is erroneous: it assumes that the will is capable of submitting itself to the imperatives of reason and of conforming itself to the truth once that is

[1] Cp. the excellent discussion of this question by C. Feckes, "Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel" (Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie, fasc. 7), 1925.

[2] "Ex parte autem hominis nihil nisi indispositio, immo, rebellio gratiae gratiam praecedit." *W.A.* 1, 225, 29.

known—to the truth, for example, that God, being the supreme being, ought to be loved above all things.[1] In Luther's view man is incapable of controlling his interior will. No doubt his reason and his conscious will allow him to determine his outward acts, but he remains powerless in face of his internal impulses. They can be changed only by a stronger impulse, by a new will. We recognize here Luther's basic conception according to which unregenerate man is incapable of any good; he is the "old man", the corrupt tree that brings forth corrupt fruit. He cannot prepare himself to receive grace because he is subject to the rule of sin. When he "does what is in his power", it bears the imprint of sin. All the good we are capable of comes from God. It is the Lord who works in us both to will and to do (Phil. 2. 13). So Luther looks upon the idea that man, motivated by concupiscence and bound in sin, could love God above all things as absurd and blasphemous. Were it not so, man, who is but dust and ashes, would have something of which to boast before God; then this being whose nature is corrupt could merit divine grace. But before God we are only sin and nothingness.[2]

What then is the truth about justification?

According to occamism, it takes place when God gives his grace to him who, on the natural level, "does what is in his power". Grace is instilled like a new quality which transforms the soul and raises its virtues to a supernatural level. The infusion of grace drives out sin and abolishes transgression. Justification is then the consequence at once of a condition of man and of a gift of God.

According to Luther, justification does not by any means spring from a new quality in regenerate man. Grace does not transform the soul nor does it exalt human nature. It is the divine mercy that brings about the forgiveness of sins. As the Spirit of God gives life, so grace confers that eternal life which is given us in and with the forgiveness of sins. We are not justified by reason of the new life which is in us, but by reason of the grace which is in God. This means that righteousness comes to us from God who imputes it to us by his grace. "Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity" (Ps. 32. 2).

Luther's teaching here presents an obvious contrast to the ordinary teaching of nominalism about justification. The fact that nominalism is marked by pelagian tendencies makes this contrast greater than that which exists in a general way between the Reformer's teaching and other areas of scholastic theology.

But when people speak of nominalist elements in Luther's theology they have something else in mind. It is in fact the other nominalist definition of justification that is considered to be the model from which Luther copied his doctrine of imputation. According to this

[1] "Falsitas est quod voluntas possit se conformare dictamini recto naturaliter. Contra Sco. Gab." *W.A.* 1, 224, 15.

[2] "Veritas itaque est quod homo arbor mala factus non potest nisi malum velle et facere." *W.A.* 1, 224, 13. "Nisi quis ex spiritu renatus sit (sit quantopere coram se et hominibus iustus, castus, capiens), caro est, vetus homo est." 1, 146, 20. "Homo vetus, vanitas vanitatum universaque vanitas." 1, 145, 29.

second definition, man would be declared righteous only because God accepts him as such quite apart from any infusion of grace. We must therefore ask what Luther's attitude was with regard to this second occamist doctrine (the doctrine of acceptance). While rejecting the current doctrine, did not Luther adopt the theory of acceptance according to which God justifies man by his absolute power without respect to the grace that is instilled into him?

We have only to glance at Luther's criticisms of nominalism to be convinced that he did nothing of the kind. Luther not only rejects the pelagianism of his predecessors; he equally criticizes their theory of acceptance. According to him, a man's salvation can be due to nothing but the grace and the mercy of God. On the other hand, the idea that God could declare a man righteous in an entirely arbitrary manner is, in his eyes, only a meaningless formula, a bad joke. To admit that idea would be equivalent to denying the very nature of grace. For grace is not a quality inherent in man. It is the life-giving Spirit of God who really makes man righteous by the forgiveness of sins and gives life to those who are in a state of spiritual death.[1] It would follow from the idea of acceptance that God declares righteous a man who is only a natural man; a purely natural love for God would in that case appear to be the equivalent of supernatural love. This conception, so far from combating the pelagian tendency inherent in nominalism, would only reinforce it by accentuating its rationalism and by reducing the role of grace in the work of salvation. The nominalists do well to say that God declares the sinner righteous; but they deny the miraculous character of this justification.

For Luther, imputation is something other than the entirely arbitrary choice of an absolute power. This term describes an event big with consequences and essential in the divine order of salvation. Imputation is nothing else but the work of grace. And grace, instead of being the arbitrary will of God, works the justification of the sinner because of Jesus Christ. *Acceptance* means that God declares a sinner righteous because he is all-powerful; *imputation* means that God imputes to man the righteousness of Christ by faith. Imputation does not base salvation solely on the all-powerfulness of God; it bases it on the fulfilment of the law by Jesus Christ and on the infinite merits of the Saviour. To the arbitrary acceptance of nominalism the Reformation opposes its principle of "proper Christum".

For Luther, the whole point is that it is the sinner who is justified. The man of whom he speaks is not predisposed to salvation by any natural love for God. On the contrary, only the sinner can be justified. Only he who sees himself as God sees him—sinful, corrupt and wretched—can become before God what he would wish to be—righteous, good and pious. God's action operates in an opposite direction to man's. He lifts up the humble, justifies the sinner, gives life

[1] "Non potest deus acceptare hominem sine gratia Dei justificante. Contra Occam." *W.A.* 1, 227, 4. "Gratia dei nunquam sic coexistit ut ociosa Sed est vivus, mobilis et operosus spiritus, Nec per Dei absolutam potentiam fieri potest, ut actus amicitiae sit et gratia Dei praesens non sit. Contra Gab." 1, 227, 1.

to the dead. That is why men are required to be humble and sincere and to see themselves as God sees them. Only then can God act as he intends, and give righteousness and life.[1]

The righteousness imputed to the sinner is by no means a declaration empty of real content. It is the very righteousness of God, a "strange righteousness" (*aliena justitia*) of which we become partakers when God exchanges our guilt for the satisfaction wrought by Christ. There is a sense in which the nominalist idea of acceptance also means that it is the sinner who is justified. But then this justification takes place on the ground of man's natural virtue which the absolute power of God declares to be perfect and supernatural. Punishment is remitted without any satisfaction on man's part and the gift of virtue is conferred without infusion of grace. On the other hand, with Luther it is a real righteousness that becomes ours, although it is strange to us. By it alone we become righteous. It is imputed to us in virtue not of an arbitrary decision but of the faithfulness and mercy of God.

II. Theology and Philosophy

Attempts have also sometimes been made to prove that Luther was nominalist in his views concerning the relations between theology and philosophy. The disparity that Luther sees between these two disciplines is taken to correspond to the line of demarcation which nominalism draws between natural knowledge and revelation. In both cases a new point of view will have taken the place of that harmony between faith and knowledge which was characteristic of classical scholasticism. The ultimate consequence of this conception is the theory of two kinds of truth.

But such an interpretation is too simple, and it fails to take account of the real situation. Certainly there are points of contact between Luther and the nominalists here as well as in regard to justification. There is, however, an essential theological difference between them which is of capital importance.

What distinguishes theology from philosophy according to occamism is the fact that the former has to do with revealed truths which cannot be completely proved, whereas philosophy is concerned with knowledge that can be demonstrated with certainty. To the question whether theology is entitled to be called a science, occamism gives a negative answer. Note, however, that this answer assumes a quite precise definition of what a science is. Only axiomatic principles and syllogisms that can be deduced from them are entitled to be termed science (*scientia*) in what was then regarded as the proper sense of the word. Because theology issues from different presuppositions, the information it yields is outside the field of philosophy or scientific knowledge.

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[1] "Cum iustitia fidelium sit in Deo abscondita, peccatum vero eorum manifestum in seipsis, Verum est, non nisi iustos damnari atque peccatores et meretrices salvari." *W.A.* 1, 148, 35. "In conspectu meo semper sum peccator." 149, 1. "Stat firma sententia: Qui volet justus fieri, peccator fiat necesse est." 5, 195, 41. Cp. 7, 546 f.

At the same time, this clear line of demarcation between theology and science is only one aspect of the occamist theory of knowledge. Occamism also established very close links between the two spheres. Actually the scholastic method of presentation, which characterizes its theology, shows that in practice it hardly establishes an impassable barrier between faith and reason. It seeks, moreover, by considerations of principle to justify the rationalistic way of dealing with theological questions. It supposes that certain theological truths belong also to the sphere of philosophical knowledge; for example, the doctrines of the existence and nature of God. The elements of natural theology are thus within the scope of metaphysics. The fundamental conception that they have in common is that of being. But in this case what is the distinguishing character of theological truths properly so-called? Occam answers that, in so far as such truths are contingent, they cannot be known with certainty. To this class belong such propositions as "God creates" or "God has become man". On the other hand, theological truths that are necessary, e.g. "God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit", can to some extent be the object of demonstrable knowledge. To be sure, there is no direct perception of them, which is normally the basis of this kind of knowledge. But perception is in this case replaced by a divine intervention: revelation, which is accepted by faith.

These examples show how occamism sought to forge links between theological and philosophical knowledge and to make room for theology in its general theory of knowledge. Not only are certain theological truths accessible to reason, but those that rest on a supernatural revelation can, after the event, become the object of rational speculation. Theological knowledge is, so to speak, on the same level as rational knowledge. The chief difference between them is that the former presupposes revelation and faith, faith being conceived as the submission of the will to the authority of revealed truth. As we have already said, nominalism holds that such a faith is possible on the natural level: man can produce it by his natural powers. Free will is then capable of adhering to truths of faith which ecclesiastical authority proposes to it.

Thus it is by starting from the theory of knowledge that occamism tries to solve the problem of the tension between faith and reason. Theological propositions cannot be demonstrated; some of them cannot be evidently known. They presuppose the submission of faith to authority. But, once these presuppositions are admitted, reason can take hold of them and deal with them according to its own laws. Therefore, although occamism clearly distinguishes between theology and scientific knowledge, it postulates an entire harmony between faith and reason. That is why it has no difficulty in practising scholastic speculation on the content of faith and even carrying it further.

Luther really followed the occamists in regard to theology and philosophy. He also takes the separation of these two spheres as his point of departure. For him as for his precursors the knowledge that faith gives is of a different kind from that which reason gives. It out-

reaches rational understanding (*supra rationis captum*), and above all it presupposes the existence and experience of faith.

But when Luther says that you can only understand the Gospel in temptation (*in der Situation der Anfechtung*), he is undoubtedly taking his stand on other presuppositions than those of the nominalists, for whom knowledge through faith is of the same kind as practical knowledge and depends on acceptance by the will of a revealed truth. It is not, however, to be denied that there is a certain kinship in thought between Luther and the nominalists on this point. We meet in both the same conviction that theology has for its object truths which are, in the final analysis, impenetrable mysteries and that it is thereby distinguished from the profane sciences. Still, Luther's point of view is not that of the nominalist theologians. The best proof of this is that he broke radically with all the rational speculation in theological matters which marked the earlier tradition.

Luther sees in the tension between faith and reason something other than a problem connected with the theory of knowledge. For him this tension is primarily a theological problem. The knowledge that faith gives is altogether inaccessible to reason, not only because the natural intelligence is insufficient here, but chiefly because human reason is blinded by original sin and it lacks that spiritual light without which man is incapable of understanding revealed truths. Reason is not only man's natural way of thinking: this term also denotes man's perverted attitude to things divine. Reason bears the imprint of our carnal sentiments. Natural reason is therefore an obstacle to faith. If it cannot understand the Gospel, this is not only because of the supernatural character of faith-knowledge, but also because unregenerate man cannot rid himself of his perverted attitude. In everything he does he seeks his own interests. He tries to become righteous in the sight of God by good works which he produces. For a man to arrive at faith, his reason must first die and new light must be given him by the Holy Spirit. He cannot produce this faith himself. His free will cannot accept truths of faith. All is divine gift: not only the revelation as such, but also the faith that accepts the truth of revelation. "God has convicted the wisdom of the world of foolishness." All that belongs to man must be destroyed before God makes us partakers of the wisdom and spiritual knowledge that belong to faith.

These familiar notions are enough to show us that, for Luther, the relations between faith and reason are closely connected with the basic principles of his theology. This is the measure of the distance that separated him, at this point, from occamism. For Luther this problem does not belong only to the sphere of the theory of knowledge. The difference between faith and reason must be studied on the basis of an anthropology stamped with the doctrine of original sin. For occamism reason is capable of understanding the content of revelation and making it an object of speculation. According to Luther, on the other hand, natural reason must be annihilated before we can understand "the things of the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2. 14).

It should not be concluded that Luther denied all activity of reason

in the sphere of faith. It is only necessary to recall the part reason plays in his famous words at Worms, according to which, if he was to be made to retract, he must be convinced by arguments drawn from the Scriptures or by indubitable reasons (*ratione evidente*). Plainly, Luther also refers to reason where there is a question of understanding the content of revelation and of formulating it theologically. But in this case it is the regenerate reason which submits without hesitation to divine revelation. There is no question of knowledge derived from natural reason being, so to speak, completed by revealed knowledge. Rather, faith itself becomes for the believer a new reason which Luther calls *ratio renata* or *ratio fidei*.

We find, then, in Luther two different points of view on the relations between reason and truths of faith. On the one hand he can say that faith combines with reason and makes use of it. On the other hand he presupposes that faith fights against reason, which must die and be annihilated in order that faith can arise within us. In the former case he means the natural function of reason as such; in the latter, the term "reason" denotes the perverted and carnal state of mind as also the compromise with the world, which are characteristic of the "old man".

Here is an example that will illustrate what we have said above, and also show, in conclusion, how this theology sets Luther in opposition to the nominalists.

In his "Disputation against Scholastic Theology" of 1517, Luther attacks, among other things, the idea of a "special logic of faith" (*logica fidei*), which was approved by the nominalists. Here is the text of his thesis on this subject: "It is in vain that one imagines a logic of faith, a *suppositio mediata* beyond terms and number."[1] The addition, "against recent logicians", shows that he was criticizing conceptions that were current in nominalist circles. Some advocates of that system, in fact, thought that the rules of aristotelian logic could not apply to the doctrine of the Trinity without producing heretical conclusions. They applied the same principle to other dogmas as well—for example, to certain parts of Christology. We can see from several of Luther's disputations that he shared this point of view. Nominalism, however, proposed to provide a remedy for this incompatibility between logic and the Church's dogmas by substituting for the current logic another logic. Its rules would be broad enough to make it applicable to the sphere of faith. That is what was called the "logic of faith". This is the best possible example of the way in which the nominalist school separated theology and science. In rejecting the idea of a particular logic of faith, Luther shows that he is critical of the occamist tradition. The idea of a logic of faith assumes that the mysteries of faith can be enclosed within the rules of rational thinking. Even if truths of faith are outside the sphere of

[1] "Frustra fingitur logica fidei, suppositio mediata extra terminum et numerum. Contra recentes dialecticos." *W.A.* 1, 226, 19. For the problems involved in this text, cp. Haegglund, *Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition*. Lunds Universitets Årsskrift, vol. 51: 4, Lund, 1955, pp. 43 ff.

properly philosophical knowledge, they are, as it were, *a posteriori* subject to speculation and scientific discussion. Luther's criticism involves the outright rejection of traditional theological speculation. Further, if the thesis cited above is to be explained in harmony with the Reformer's fundamental conceptions, it must be said that he sees in the logic of faith a mixture of theology and science which he felt bound to condemn. Truths of faith ought to be explained in a manner different from profane knowledge. It is useless and vain to want to submit the mysteries of faith to the laws of reason. Faith must not be submitted to reason; that is why no rule of logic should be imposed on divine truth.

If the relation between occamism and Luther is considered only on the ground of the theory of knowledge, then there seems to be only a minimal difference between them, a nuance. But when the theological meaning and the practical consequences of this difference are examined, it seems like a profound and pregnant transformation of all theological methodology and of Christian dogmatic theology.

BENGT HAEGGLUND.

Psalter Revision

"WHAT I don't like about Shakespeare," said a twelve-year-old American, "is the words: I don't understand them." The recipient of this wistful observation was a devout and scholarly man who quoted it in an article on *Religious Jargon*. With the Authorized Version of the Bible, he added, our trouble is just the opposite: it is precisely because we like the words so much that we often fail to understand them, and being thus mesmerized we are in danger of reading the Bible in church as a kind of incantation rather than for the edification of the hearers. He then passed from the Bible to consider the services of the Book of Common Prayer. He admitted that a worshipper can genuinely lift up his heart in words he does not understand, for worship is a mystery not wholly confined within the four walls of reason. Nevertheless, the liturgy of all Protestant Churches is grounded in reasonable understanding, and there are limits!

In THEOLOGY for February of this year Hugh Casson dealt at some length with the problem of Psalter revision, and gave special attention to a comparison of P.B.V. with R.V., American R.S.V., and Harold Riley's version (1948). He commended for our use in church the Book of Psalms in R.S.V. with an enthusiasm which many, one supposes, will find it impossible to share. It is hard to believe that we shall find there the solution to our problem. For one thing, it is inconceivable that we should decide to adopt it as the Anglican Psalter at a time when our own scholars are in the very midst of their epoch-making work on a new translation of the Bible. Their Book of Psalms, for which we shall probably have to wait seven or eight years, may in the end prove not to be what we want for chanting in our public worship, but it would be absurd to make up our minds before

we have seen it. We shall find here the meaning of the Psalms, so far as it can be established by our finest Biblical scholars. But they are faced with the intractable task of expressing that meaning in a suitable poetic form. Suitable for what? It is not unreasonable to suggest that they should make a liturgical distinction between the Book of Psalms and the rest of the Old Testament: that whereas they frame the rest of the O.T. (and N.T.) for public reading, they should frame the Book of Psalms for public singing.[1] If they could accept this practical distinction, then deliberately, and without any prejudice to the felicity of their version, they would choose those rhythms and cadences which best lend themselves to the form of music used by the vast majority of their countrymen, both Anglican and Free Church—namely, the Anglican chant. This is not to say that the new version would appear in the O.T. ready pointed for chanting: but (a far greater thing) it would be appropriate for it; "apt" for it, as the Tudors used to say. It must be added that such an aim, if accepted by the translators, could hardly fail to suggest the advantage of consultation at an early stage (through the Liturgical Commission) with those having full experience of the ethos of Anglican chanting.

The translators might feel, however, that this object would restrict their freedom of manoeuvre in a terrain which is difficult enough already. If so, a most promising course still remains open—a revision of Coverdale; though even for that we should have to await the publication of N.E.T., which would necessarily serve as the standard of accuracy of translation.

A great deal of work has already been done on the revision of Coverdale. As long ago as 1916 a Committee[2] was appointed by Archbishop Davidson "to secure the revision of passages in the Psalter in which the language is specially obscure or misleading". Its members recognized that Coverdale had been accepted, to the exclusion of any other version, by the practically unanimous feeling of the Church of England as satisfying the requirements of a book of public devotion. But, they pointed out, its errors may affect either the sense or the devotional value. Often they do not affect the latter at all: but sometimes they warp, not merely alter, the sense, and sometimes they make nonsense. And we are called to offer to God a "reasonable service".

The Committee, conscious of the Englishman's long-felt and overwhelming reluctance to change Coverdale even where change meant clear and justified improvement, "proposed no change, which did not present itself to us as necessary towards intelligent devotional use of the verse or passage in question". On this basis, they proposed

[1] Although in the Free Churches the Book of Psalms is drawn upon mainly to provide the Old Testament lection, it must be remembered that the *Methodist Hymn Book* (1933) contains fifty psalms, or portions of psalms, pointed for Anglican chanting, and *Congregational Praise* (1951) seventy-five. Though these may not be widely used in public worship at present, the strong likelihood is that their use will increase. Both books adopt A.V.

[2] It consisted of Dr Jayne (Chairman), Dr Chase, Dr Kirkpatrick, Dr Beeching, Dr Armitage Robinson, Dr A. C. Benson, Dr J. W. Mackail, and Dr Nairne (Secretary). The names are like music.

a hundred and seventy-four changes of words, twenty-seven changes of punctuation, separation of the four doxologies marking the end of the Books, and six divisions of over-long verses.

Foreseeing a widespread, if largely sentimental, dissatisfaction with even these highly conservative recommendations, they recalled the hope expressed in the preface to the second edition of the Bishops' Bible of 1572, which included a revised version of the Psalter in columns parallel with the old, that the gentle reader will "have this Christian consyderation within himselfe, that though he findeth the Psalms of this later translation following not so to sound agreeable to his eares in his wonted woordes and phrases as he is accustomed with: yet let him not be too much offended with the worke, which was wrought for his owne commoditie and comfort". This frank statement did nothing to allay suspicions in 1572, and history repeated itself, for the House of Laity rejected this modestly revised Psalter of 1916 as part of the Revised Prayer Book of 1928, though it had been adopted as such by the Convocations. But America (1928) and Ireland (1923) adopted it, and the Dean of St Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin, wrote in a letter to an English bishop that, though opposed to its adoption at first, twenty-one years' constant use had converted him to a whole-hearted advocacy of it; and the bishop to whom he wrote (one of our foremost liturgists) has given his own opinion that even so cautious a revision "brings new life to the Psalms, and so to Mattins and Evensong".

More profound attention should, however, be paid to Bishop Frere's *A Liturgical Psalter, arranged for use in the services of the Church*.[1] Any liturgical Psalter of to-day, he says, must have in view the needs and limitations of the Anglican chant. Proceeding on that admirably realistic basis, he lists in his preface sixteen grounds for changing Coverdale on account of rhythm, emphasizing that "they all tend to make the Psalter more rhythmical, not less, and therefore more singable, and even more sayable, when 'saying' the psalm means a dignified recitation, rhythmical and concerted, not a gabble or a race". The difficulty of obtaining the book at present makes it advisable to set out his principles here in summary form:

Grounds for Rhythmical Change

A. To meet the problem of wedding a twofold Anglican chant to threefold parallelism:
   1. Excision of one of the members of a triple parallelism.
   2. Adaptation of one of these to make a separate verse.
   3. Shifting of the colon, for convenience.
   4. Shifting of the colon, to restore the original parallelism.
   5. Subdivision of lines containing five pulses.

B. To accommodate the words to the somewhat inflexible rhythm of the Anglican chant:
   6. Exclusion of unrhythmical words in the cadence.
   7. Avoidance of unrhythmical words in the recitation.

[1] Mowbray, 1925. At this time when concern for a revised Psalter is deepening, a reprint is much to be desired.

8. Change for the sake of rhythm.
9. Adoption of the more rhythmical of two alternative versions.
10. Lengthening of the words in very short verses.
11. Adaptation in order to make possible the use of a double chant.
12. Repetition of the second half of a double chant to fit verses which are grouped in threes.
13. The same in order to close a section.
14. The same in case of refrains.
15. Subdivision of an existing verse.
16. Redistribution of verses.

So far as *retranslation* is concerned, the bishop's changes are mainly those of tense, particle, person, number, article. Insignificant and hardly noticeable in themselves, these changes make innumerable obscure passages clear.

Dr Frere recognizes one further ground for change, and it is of the greatest importance. In producing this Liturgical Psalter his most estimable purpose was to put into the mouths of a Sunday evening congregation[1] such passages only as it could find edifying and real. This positive selection of what could justly claim to be congregational and devotional, suited to the needs of those who lacked sufficient skill in mystical interpretation, or sufficient historical perspective, to turn the whole Psalter to spiritual profit, meant that there were certain classes of passage upon which choice did not fall:

1. Fourteen complete psalms (*14, 35, 49, 52, 58, 59, 64, *70, 75, 76, 82, 83, 87, *108), those marked with an asterisk being duplicates.

And in detail:

2. Unintelligible passages.
3. Obscure allusions.
4. Passages which refer *in detail* to events of Jewish history.
5. Passages dealing *at length* with the misdeeds of adversaries.
6. Vindictive and pharisaical passages.
7. Passages ascribing unworthy sentiments to God.
8. Passages displaying *at length* lack of hope of any future life.
9. Duplicates and glosses.
10. Passages implying O.T. sacrifices as a living part of the worshipper's devotional life.

This appears a formidable list: but, in fact, under headings 2 to 10 there are only sixty-six omissions all told, of which no less than twenty-one are duplicates and glosses.

The bishop reminds us that, while recitation-in-course of the whole Psalter was characteristic of monastic services, and suited to experts in devotion, in the people's services the method of selection prevailed. Nowhere in Christendom, except where the English Prayer Book is used, are ordinary lay-people expected to attempt the task of continuous recitation, and of them only a tiny minority do so. The Table in R.P.B. "hankers after the discarded ideal", by working in most of the Psalms for Sunday use. Dr Frere's object was, not to

[1] Is there really as great a difference between evening and morning congregations as we sometimes imagine?

criticize that Table, but to give an example of the positive and wholehearted principle of selecting Psalms on their merits; that is, on a basis of their utility for the purpose of the Christian worship of ordinary congregations.

The same purpose inspired *The Broadcast Psalter*,[1] the conception of which was greeted with "immense interest" by Archbishop Temple, though he did not live to see its birth. As Eric Heaton said, when reviewing it on the Third Programme, it grapples again with "the difficulty of designing a work of Hebrew scholarship for the devotional use of Everyman. It must communicate meaning, and not just words, from the Psalmist to the worshipper: it must keep faith with both: it must be at once historical, intelligible, and persuasive. Scholarship and art must be wedded—and in church, in the face of a very diverse congregation." The art (and, where change is necessary, the exemplar) remains Coverdale's: the scholarship is that of the late Professor F. S. Marsh, of Selwyn College, Cambridge, at whose feet this writer, as editor, sat enthralled for many an hour. "Let me put on my other glasses, and then I shall hear you better." With this Taylor in Wonderland opening our conferences began. And then: "Do you want to begin Psalm 61 with 'Attend unto my yell, JHVH'?" From which sprang his principle that "if Coverdale makes reasonable sense and doesn't offend grossly against the rules of Hebrew grammar or syntax, it had better be left as it is. The same applies to guesses at the meaning of single words of which the exact significance is still unknown: and it means that several points may be stretched in favour of familiar phrases." To this was added a further principle that "in passages where the Hebrew text is in such disorder that it is no longer possible to be certain what the original author wrote, or what he was trying to say, a conjectural restoration should be provided by some form of words based on the Hebrew, which is intelligible and in general harmony with those parts of the Psalm where the meaning is clear: preferring these hazards to the row of asterisks which a conscientious Hebrew scholar would suggest, and remembering that all new renderings are to be sung to Anglican chants".

A brief sentence of explanation was added at the head of each Psalm (a feature of Canon Dalton's revision of 1931) and attention was drawn here and there to the structure of a Psalm which could be brought out by the use of contrasting voices, or groups of voices. Seventy Psalms, or portions of Psalms, were selected.[2] with the positive intention of setting before the heterogeneous listening congregation—the Sunday evening congregation plus—those which seemed specially suitable for use in broadcast services to-day. The difficulty of choosing Psalms for the ordinary layman is exemplified in the words of one critic who wrote: "You have in fact omitted nearly all the Psalms which are most valuable for specifically Christian worship."

[1] *The Broadcast Psalter: Selections from the Psalter together with twelve Canticles as used by the British Broadcasting Corporation.* S.P.C.K. 1948.

[2] The selection was governed not by content alone but by the time available in services broadcast from the studio, for which purpose the revision was made.

A reviewer, however, judged it likely that the Church of England would "presently be led to make use of this selection in formulating its use of the Psalms for Mattins and Evensong on Sundays". He added that, in prescribing the daily psalmody to be used by the Anglican clergy on weekdays, it might well take serious account of Harold Riley's *The Revision of the Psalter* (1948). This includes all of the one hundred and fifty Psalms, and between it and *The Broadcast Psalter* there was much fruitful two-way traffic.

The Broadcast Psalter was pointed for chanting, and chants were provided. The result has been broadcast in the Daily Service on weekdays at 10.15 a.m. ever since January 1949. It was primarily because they were in a unique position to enable the great mass of English people to hear what a revision of Coverdale would actually sound like that the members of the B.B.C.'s Religious Broadcasting Department were impelled to an enterprise which otherwise they, as such, had no special authority to promote.

It is most necessary that the Common Psalter, so to call it, should also be pointed for chanting, though there would hardly be room in the smaller prayer books even for the melody line of the chants. We are now emerging from a period of what might be described as surrealist pointing—an aberration largely caused by the words "speech-rhythm". We recognize in them now a misnomer, because the canons of conversational speech cannot be applied to corporate song. So there would be no great difficulty at this time of day in agreeing upon a "parish" pointing, and it is highly desirable for every reason to take this opportunity, if it arises, to do so.

An inherent part of the problem of Psalter revision, as Bishop Frere saw, is that of *selection*, and it would be pusillanimous to burke that issue. A revised Psalter is for the use of the whole worshipping Church—for the millions of the laity, plus the few thousand clergy. In providing a Psalter within a Book of Common (not merely clerical) Prayer, the needs of a small minority of experts should not be the controlling factor. A selective Psalter, it is true, is not likely to meet the needs of all the clergy. No matter: for the Daily Offices P.B.V. would be available, where desired.[1] Many clergy, however, would be just as likely to welcome it for daily use, and few, one supposes, would seriously maintain that the Psalter, unabridged and unexpurgated, can to-day edify more than the minutest fraction of the laity in church on Sundays, if the R.P.B. Table is used in full.

Many, no doubt, will cast longing eyes upon the American Prayer Book which, in its new daily lectionary of 1943 (integrating psalms and lessons) has, in the words of its commentator, Massey Shepherd,

[1] But is that good enough? Surely those who recite the Psalms for the Day in course desire, as a matter of intellectual integrity, the most faithful translation attainable. The report of the 1916 Committee remarks that the perpetuation, against the light of admitted facts, of demonstrable errors in translation may tend to impair that regard for accuracy which is more than a mere idol of scholars, and is indeed one form of a sensitive and conscientious regard for truth. In other words, mis-translations here, if known to be such, ought to *hurt* serious worshippers as it now hurts serious musicians to sing much of the Tudor music in pre-Fellowes editions.

"provided a fresh approach to the use of the Psalter, which represents a healthy balance between regular course reading and topical or seasonal selection".

Whether N.E.T. will, in the Book of Psalms, make music in any way comparable with Coverdale's, we are not yet in a position to know. If it does not, we have no reason to despair. We know already that a revision of Coverdale is perfectly possible, with results infinitely less disturbing than many people ever dreamed possible to ears attuned to hallowed words and phrases.

Cyril V. Taylor.

Letter from the West Indies

Until quite recently the West Indies was the "forgotten province" of the Anglican Communion. Within the past few years, however, our efforts to make our voices heard in England, strongly relayed by S.P.G., have succeeded to some extent in awakening the Church at home to a realization of our present needs and of the strategic importance of the situation in which we are placed. In this we have been helped considerably by the amount of space given in the press to political events in the West Indian Colonies, especially the approach to Federation, and by the arrival in Britain of large numbers of West Indians seeking employment. The presence of West Indians in such numbers in London, Birmingham and other cities is in itself evidence of the past neglect of the Caribbean Colonies, where a lack of foresight in providing for the economic development of these territories with their rapidly increasing population has created very difficult problems to which a solution must now be found. The schemes which are now coming into operation for the economic development of the West Indies are impressive, as for example in British Guiana, where $100 million is to be spent within the next five years; but one cannot help wondering whether assistance even on this scale is not "too little and too late" because of the rapid growth in population and the enormous potential needs of gainful employment.

At the beginning of the last century the West Indian Colonies were relatively more prosperous than they are to-day and the Church was "established" and in a privileged position. The parish clergy were paid and church property was maintained by the Government. The Church in those spacious days made good use of its opportunities, extending its work in all directions and very soon including in its membership the majority of the inhabitants. As a result the West Indian territories are to-day predominantly Christian and the Church is everywhere committed to a tremendous pastoral responsibility. During the past forty years one diocese after another has had to accept disestablishment and the cessation of state aid, and since by the time this happened the missionary societies were already heavily committed to the support of new work in Africa, India and other parts of the world, the Church in the West Indies was obliged to rely almost entirely upon its own local resources, upon the sup-

port of the people of an economically depressed area where the standard of living was often shockingly low and falling. S.P.G. and the other societies did their utmost to help, as they have always done, but they were not able to give assistance to the West Indies on a scale commensurate with its great and growing needs.

The West Indian dioceses have gained as well as lost in their experience of financial stringency since disestablishment occurred. They have gained in the development of a brave spirit of independence and self-reliance which has led to their becoming increasingly, and in some places almost entirely, self-supporting. But the losses have been great and serious. Shabby and broken-down buildings and churches poorly and inadequately furnished, all too common in the Caribbean, witness to the present poverty of these dioceses and have a depressing influence upon the people who live around them, suggesting that "the glory has departed". More serious still in its effect upon the life of the Church, however, is the acute shortage of clergy that has resulted from the enforced economies of recent years. The number of parish priests is now less than three-quarters what it was at the time of the disestablishment, though the work has increased and extended considerably since then. The resulting situation is everywhere difficult and in some places desperate. In the urban areas an incumbent may have to minister alone to tens of thousands of people living in overcrowded streets and tenements who turn to him in all their needs, and he will probably have a couple of thousand names on the roll of regular communicants and several hundred persons coming to receive Holy Communion at a Sunday celebration. In the rural areas a priest is usually responsible for a large number of churches separated by great distances and involving long and sometimes dangerous journeys by land or sea. In either case it is physically impossible for him to meet the demands made upon him or to exercise the pastoral care of his flock that is necessary. If the priest falls sick, and when his turn comes to take a short holiday, it is seldom possible to provide a deputy. At best the priest of a neighbouring parish, himself already committed to far more work than he can possibly do, is asked to re-arrange his monthly program, reduce the services in his own churches and do what little he can to shepherd the other congregations that would otherwise be entirely neglected. In the West Indies we are well served by catechists and voluntary readers, whose devoted services deserve the highest praise; but they cannot administer the Sacraments, and it is the Sacraments that the people want. With heart-rending frequency we West Indian bishops receive letters like the following: "Dear My Lord, It is now eight weeks since Christmas and we have not yet received our Christmas Communion. Do please send us a priest soon." And what can one do if there is no one to send? Our people must have "religion". They are loyal at heart and prefer their own religion; but some sort of "religion" they will have. Hence it happens all too frequently that we find the vacuum has been filled by some strange sect, the leaders of which have not been slow to take advantage of the Church's inability to provide for the pastoral care of her members.

The foregoing account of the position of the Church in the West Indies deals with only one part of her life and work, namely that of the ministry of the Word and Sacraments to the faithful, and is therefore incomplete. Our Lord's commission is to "preach the Gospel to every creature"; and, as William Temple was wont to remind us, "the Church exists primarily for the sake of those who are still outside it". The majority of the people living in the West Indies are at least nominally Christian, and the Church is numerically strong—so strong, in fact, as to create the first difficult problem under present conditions of inadequate staff and other resources that I have tried to state. We have indeed "enclosed a great multitude of fishes" and our nets are breaking, so that we are compelled to beckon to "our partners in the other ship to come over and help us" lest the rich catch be lost. But also we have a second problem to solve, no less urgent than the first. There are still thousands living in the West Indies who have yet to be won for Christ, some are pagans and large numbers, especially in British Guiana and Trinidad, Hindoo and Moslem. That the Church in the West Indies does not lack the missionary spirit is shown by her notable achievement in starting and continuing generously to support the work in the Rio Pongas in West Africa; but the sad truth is that very little has been done in the way of systematic evangelism at home in the West Indies. For a long time the Hindoos and Moslems resisted any attempt to preach the Gospel to them, but recently (in British Guiana, at least) such resistance has weakened considerably; and indeed many young men and women of non-Christian parentage and upbringing are now voluntarily seeking instruction for Holy Baptism. We are thus presented suddenly with a great opportunity—an opportunity which we have reason to think will not wait upon our convenience but which must be taken at once or almost certainly lost for ever. Unless substantial reinforcements of men and money can be found quickly the opportunity will be lost, because the impoverished and hard-pressed Church in the West Indies is in no position to take it unaided.

But even this is not all. The present emphasis in the West Indies is upon development, and the governments are carrying out ambitious schemes for the political and economic advancement of these territories. In British Guiana, for example, where the development program is the most comprehensive, no less than $100 million has been allocated for extraordinary expenditure within the next five years. How does this affect the Church? In two ways. First, it demands of the Church a tremendous expansion and extension of her parish work, because she must be ready to follow her people as they move to the new housing estates and also to provide for the spiritual care of a number of entirely new centres of population that will be created by extensive land-settlement schemes and around new industries. These changes in the social and economic structure of the territory are already taking place so rapidly and on such a scale that even a well-established and wealthy diocese would be hard put to it to keep pace with them. We who possess no reserves of men or money

and who are struggling desperately all the time merely to meet our present commitments are powerless to deal with the situation without substantial help from outside. But it is not only a question of providing more buildings and more priests to serve the new areas. The whole situation presents a challenge to the Church of a different order. Economic and political progress without a corresponding spiritual advancement can end only in disaster. The future of the West Indies will be safeguarded not only, or even primarily, by increased material prosperity but by the spiritual and moral vitality of the population; and it is therefore to the Church that the West Indies must look for influence and inspiration in this critical period of its history. Such is the nature of our present opportunity; and we cannot divest ourselves of the responsibility which we must bear for the faithful discharge of the stewardship to which God has called us at such a time as this. A new nation is coming to birth; and it is our business to ensure, so far as possible, that it will be a Christian nation.

Lest we in the West Indies should be completely overwhelmed by a realization of the magnitude of the task before us or of the extreme danger of any failure on our part to rise to the occasion, Almighty God has, in his loving providence, allowed us to see that we do not stand alone. There has already been an encouraging response to the appeal recently launched by the Bishops of the Province, both in money and in offers by priests in England of personal service. S.P.G. and S.P.C.K. have somehow managed to increase their annual grants. And the Mirfield Fathers have come out to take charge of our Theological College at Codrington where local men are trained for the ministry. For all this we lift up our hearts in humble thankfulness. The Church in the West Indies has always had a strong local ministry but has never had the means to train enough priests to meet the increasing demand and will not be able to do so for some years to come. Our immediate need, therefore, is the recruitment of more men from England; and at the present time our requirements are considerable. It may be an over-bold suggestion to make, but I wish that every English diocese could be persuaded to spare us from among its own clergymen at least one experienced priest and through its Missionary Council to provide the entire cost of his maintenance for a period of, say, five or ten years. If only one could awaken the Church of England to an appreciation of the present situation in the West Indies, this and much more than this would be done unhesitatingly and quickly to save the day. At the Church Congress in Minneapolis in 1954 we were reminded that at certain times and in certain places a situation develops which is of such strategic importance that the whole Church ought to concentrate all available forces upon it. Of such a nature I believe the situation in the West Indies now to be.

† Alan Guiana,
Archbishop of the West Indies.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Mr Carré is Reader in Philosophy in the University of Bristol.

Dr Haegglund is an assistant professor in the University of Lund, Sweden.

The Rev. Cyril V. Taylor is Warden of the Royal School of Church Music, Addington Palace, Surrey.

The Most Rev. Alan Knight has been Bishop of Guiana since 1937 and Archbishop of the West Indies since 1950.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE NEW LECTIONARY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Members of the Lectionary Committees of the two Convocations will be grateful to Bishop Haigh for his sympathetic review of their work in the April number of THEOLOGY and for his helpful suggestions. May I be allowed to draw attention to an incorrect statement in the first paragraph of the article, concerning the authorization of the *New Lectionary*? Bishop Haigh states that the Convocations resolved that on and after Advent Sunday next it should be the only lectionary authorized for use in the Church of England, and remarks that this fact is astonishing.

But the Convocations were not quite so precipitate as this. Their resolutions were to the effect that the *Tables of Lessons* presented to them were approved for use in York and for experimental use in Canterbury Province from the First Sunday in Advent, 1956. It was directed that the *Amended Lectionary* of 1944 (and its revisions) should cease to be used at that date, when, in any case, its authorization would have expired. But this still leaves in the field the Lectionaries of 1871 and 1922. The Convocations set forth a plan for the ultimate supersession of these two tables by the *New Lectionary*. It was resolved with regard to the *Revised Lectionary* of 1922 that steps should be taken "in due course" (*Canterbury*), "as soon as possible" (*York*), to draft a measure to repeal it; and with regard to the 1871 Lectionary York resolved "that in due course further steps be taken to repeal" the Act which authorized it; but Canterbury Lower House declined to pass this resolution at the moment.

So for the present the *New Lectionary* is canonically permitted, and it is hoped it will be widely used; and eventually the Convocations will be asked to take steps to make it (in its present or in an amended form) the only authorized lectionary of the Church.

Bishop Haigh, while relieved to learn the facts, wishes me to express his regret that he should have misunderstood, and so also misstated, the decisions of the Convocations.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

GEOFFREY G. WILLIS,

Secretary, Lectionary Committee of the Convocation of Canterbury.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Of the making of lectionaries there is no end! Dr Haigh's suggestion that further improvements should be made in the *New Lectionary*, perhaps quite wrongly, gives me dismay. When will the Church of England make up her mind what she wants to read at the Daily Office? We have had 1871, 1922, revised in 1928, 1944—and now we have 1956 with hints of further revision. Many of us—especially after buying expensive Daily Service Books—are fed up with the ever-recurring revisions. My first reaction on hearing of the *New Lectionary* was to give up the recitation of the Prayer Book Offices and revert to the use of the Breviary. At least the Breviary is not revised quite so often as is the Lectionary of the Church of England.

CROWAN VICARAGE,
CORNWALL.

Yours faithfully,
J. E. BECKERLEGGE.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Since, as I gather from your Editorial and Bishop Haigh's article, the 1871 Lectionary is "out", I would like to know by what means it is possible to ensure that the *New Lectionary* will be put in place of the other in the introductory matter to the Prayer Book. So far as I know, only one edition of the Prayer Book has ever included the 1922 Lectionary, and that is the edition sponsored by the S.P.C.K. I am quite convinced that a major deficiency of any modern lectionary has been its inaccessibility to the ordinary worshipper with a Prayer Book in his hand. I feel in this case that all future editions of the Prayer Book from a given date should include the *New Lectionary*, and that the necessary legislative approval should be sought for this purpose.

LAPLEY VICARAGE,
STAFFORD.

Yours, etc.,
C. STM. B. MACFARLANE.

Dr Haigh writes:

(1) I am grateful to Dr Willis for making it as clear as may be what the four Houses of the two Convocations did actually resolve last October in regard to the *New Lectionary*. When writing my article, prior to the publication of the official reports, I was too readily dependent on inadequate press accounts and the impressions of some members of the Convocations whom I consulted. Happily, however, the general sense of what I wrote remains unaffected. The Convocations were at any rate astonishingly quick to "set forth a plan for the ultimate supersession of" all lectionaries other than the *New*.

(2) Whatever else might be fairly said with reference to the letter from the Vicar of Crowan, it certainly does seem questionable

whether the Church of England has not had enough in recent years of the "trying-out" of lectionaries, whether such tryings-out really yield the results looked for, and whether it might not have been best for the Convocations *themselves* to have fully tested and, if necessary, revised the *New Lectionary*, and then to have confidently authorized its general use.

(3) One reason why the *Revised Lectionary* has not been more generally printed in editions of the Book of Common Prayer is, I imagine, that, while its first edition was duly authorized by Measure with the force of law (1922), a few minor changes were made in it while the Prayer Book was being revised, and were embodied in the Measure of 1928 rejected by Parliament—with consequent confusion from the Presses' point of view.

For the rest, Mr MacFarlane, in his letter, appears to desire in regard to the *New Lectionary* what the Convocations also wish.

P.S.—May I take this opportunity of making a further correction in what I wrote in April (p. 140, second complete par.)? N.L. *does* appoint *The Ten Commandments* to be read from the Bible on a Sunday—in the *Deuteronomic* version (5. 1–21, 3 Easter, E.P., Year II).

THE BAPTISMAL INTERROGATIONS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I am grateful to Mr Cuming for correcting me on one point and informing me on another: I think we agree that neither point affects my argument.

The difference between Dr Robinson and me is surely that he is concerned for theology, whereas I am concerned for liturgy also. The vital liturgical issue is to preserve, in reasonable terms, the classical interrogations which in the English rite have lost their drama, their triple form and their classical position. There are two very good reasons for preserving them: first, they are the only passage in the rite of real antiquity, having a continuous and universal history since A.D. 200; and secondly, they illuminate vividly at exactly the right point the significance of the sacrament (which St Augustine called the sacrament of faith) and can be made to indicate, as Bobbio does, that *the repentance and faith of the child are still the central issue*, even if he is not immediately capable of them.

I should like to add this further point to my article. I have recently lighted upon the following passage in the Bobbio Missal: *Spiritus Sanctus veniit in te . . . ecce virgo in utero accipiit et pariit filium.* I have also found the forms *speciim* and *faciim*, where *speciem* and *faciem* are plainly intended. I suggest that this comes very near to positive proof of my suggestion that the word *Renunciit* in the missal should be read *Renunciet.*

Yours sincerely,

E. C. WHITAKER.

THE VICARAGE,
KIRKBY-IN-FURNESS.

Q

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I am grateful to Mr Blyth Martin for showing me my flat misrepresentation of Dr Streeter on the Lawyer's Question. I wish I could plead the excuse he kindly allows, that I had not seen Streeter's book lately; and I feel disqualified from making a similar accusation on my own behalf—that whereas I said St Luke must be supposed to have written out the Pater Noster in the form liturgically familiar to his friends, Mr Blyth Martin says that on my hypothesis he must be supposed to have arbitrarily shortened the Matthaean wording.

In general, I find Mr Blyth Martin restating the arguments I discussed without adding to them, and judging unfavourably of the arguments I advanced without refuting them; what I find strong, he finds weak; what I find weak, he finds strong. If his readers will give themselves the trouble to re-read me, they will see what the opposing positions are. To advance the discussion we should have to write complete commentaries on St Matthew and St Luke. That would be the only way to get beyond his sheer assertion of the evident secondariness of the Matthaean Beatitudes and my questioning of it —I gave provisional reasons for my opinion, but he does not discuss them.

When he argues that the Lucan phenomena can be more easily worked out from Q than from Matthew, I agree with him, just as I should agree that it is easier to work out a game of Patience with Jokers than with cards of fixed values; but it is also less interesting. When he says that I cannot show reason why, in a given passage, St Luke should be following Matthew rather than Q, I agree with him again. I might undertake to show reason why a parrot was imitating a blackbird rather than a thrush; I would not undertake to show reason why he was imitating a blackbird rather than an otherwise unknown bird of a blackbird-like kind. When he says that, in certain cases, it would be as possible—sometimes even more plausible—to see St Luke as the original and St Matthew as the adaptation, I find no reason to contradict him. But since excellent grounds can be given for denying St Matthew's knowledge of St Luke, I do my best to show that the reverse relation can be fairly made out.

If I were to answer Mr Blyth Martin in full I should be mainly concerned to attack his principles of proof. When, for example, he says that St Matthew's arrangements of certain complexes, or versions of certain parables, are altogether superior, I do not contest it, but neither do I see that anything follows from it. St Luke did what he did, to write the book he wrote; and we can hope to follow the reasons for his refashionings point by point. Far more often, perhaps, than we have commonly supposed, he simply falls into the wording of the oral tradition which is familiar in his mouth, and does not bother about the niceties of Matthaean diction at all.

Similarly I admit, with one important qualification, Sir John Hawkins's painful constatation that St Luke never, after the Tempta-

tions (I should add, and the Sermon on the Mount), places a Matthaean addition to Mark in the same (I would add, or, indeed, in any) Marcan context. But again, so far as I can see, nothing follows; why should he be expected to? I have done my best to guess why he might decide to do otherwise.

Yours, etc.,
AUSTIN FARRER.

DEACONS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

It is good to have Fr Bligh's acumen applied to my letter, which certainly needed some pruning. My summary of his article was not fair comment, if by "a mere step . . ." we must mean an office with no proper independent function attached to it. What the article did appear to suggest, with evidence adduced, was that in the West it was at best somewhat irregular for the deacon not to proceed in due course to higher office.

In speaking of the *ethos* of the Byzantine rite, I should have made clear my implication that what is true of it was probably once true of all rites. Really I was much more concerned to assert the "conjunctive" function of the deacon than to deny the "disjunctive". And I am very glad to find Fr Bligh supporting me, for all rites known to him, on my positive point. I should, I fear, still hesitate to agree with him as to a disjunctive function consonant herewith, except in a very special and limited sense. Certainly, if an Anglican may presume to do so, I should join issue with Fr Gillet here. Having first become used to the Byzantine rite in countries and conditions where a deacon was far more regularly present than in Byzantine churches in Western Europe, I have always felt the absence of a deacon to leave a gap that is hard to bridge between priest and people, tending to assimilate the Byzantine to the usual *ethos* of the Western rites.

Certainly it was as the result of personal experience that I wrote of the deacon's "conjunctive" function—not as a piece of neo-platonic theory. The triad suggested, of priest-deacon-people, is quite distinct from that which I quoted from the Pseudo-Denys, of bishop-priest-deacon, in which the deacon is the third, not the second, term, and which does not appear to fit into the pattern referred to by Fr Bligh.

As to the quotation (*dans–recipiens et dans–recipiens non dans*) from Isidore—I persist in thinking that Fr Bligh's "loose rendering" obscures an important nuance.

On the point of functions, I think we are approaching deeper issues than those here under discussion. Is it only the *offices* of the presbyterate and the diaconate that are of divine institution, or has each of these, as well as the episcopate, its proper *functions* attached to it by divine appointment, the usurpation of which by the other order, however "economically" necessary, obscures the true pattern of the Church?

Yours, etc.,
DERWAS J. CHITTY.

UPTON RECTORY,
DIDCOT.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

It was interesting in your February number to read Mr Payne's rehabilitation of Thomas Arnold as a theologian and political philosopher in the light of the recent discussion about deacons.

In the three years before his early death in 1842 Arnold was urging a revival of the diaconate, although at this time he set little hope on any one reform. He proposed the ordination to the diaconate of men who would continue at a secular job but also assist in the running of a parish. They would carry out such liturgical functions as the ordinal allows and like the deacons of the early Church be busy in the relief of the poor and the sick. Arnold argued that this course had three advantages. It would provide an adequate ordained ministry for the populous parishes of the new industrial areas. It would lead to a better understanding of the Church, because these deacons, as part-ministers, part-laymen, would make impossible the identification of Church with professional clergy and they would raise the status of laymen. It would be a step towards that comprehensive national Church, which Arnold saw as the goal of Church policy in England, by allowing a place in the ministry of the established Church to those men who at that time could enter only the dissenting ministries. It was Church extension from three aspects.

Arnold's views on the diaconate appear in the following: a sermon preached in Rugby Parish Church on 8th December 1839, No. 38 in *Christian Life, Its Course, Its Hindrances, and Its Helps*; the introduction to this volume; a paper circulated among his friends in 1841 on the Order of Deacons, pp. 427–9 in the volume of *Miscellaneous Works*; letters to Stanley (February 1839) and to Chevalier Bunsen (May 1840), p. 502 and p. 559 of Stanley's *Life of Thomas Arnold*.

Yours faithfully,
M. J. JACKSON.

78 GREASBRO ROAD,
SHEFFIELD 9.

CANON LAW

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Your editorial remarks on Canon Law and its enforcement, in the April number of THEOLOGY, call to mind a passage from Archbishop Benson's *Cyprian* (p. 520): "The Church has never been ruled by its canons except for brief instants. Men collect themselves from time to time and formulate for eternity the standard of the hour, and as soon as it is fixed the stream sets away from it again."

Yours faithfully,
T. R. MILFORD.

THE CHANCERY,
LINCOLN.
25th April 1956.

BOOK REVIEWS

ST PAUL'S IN ITS GLORY. 1831–1911. By G. L. Prestige. S.P.C.K. 21s.

This entrancing account of St Paul's Cathedral from 1831 to the death of Dean Gregory should be of interest to many beyond the wide circle of those who have served or been in touch with the cathedral's life. Of life there were not many obvious signs at the beginning of the period; "emptiness and dirt" were its outward marks; yet people attended the services. The late Dr Prestige has told the story of revivification with learning, affection and a certain astringent humour, and adorned it with portraits and pictures. It is the story of a remarkable combination of administrative skills and religious concern, due to a fortunate collaboration of great men in the eighty years under review.

What problems the Chapter had to deal with! Their own pluralities; financial reforms started from outside by Commissioners who could not envisage each place in the concrete; the independence of at least three sets of cathedral functionaries with their own endowments or sources of income, the lay clerks, the vergers and the minor canons. Then there were vast tasks in connexion with the fabric, the interior structures, the organ, decorations and the school for choristers. It looks a dull catalogue of jobs when summarized in a review, but the most pedestrian business details are enlivened by Dr Prestige's graphic pen, and on every level of the cathedral's activity the life is conveyed by his adroit characterization of the persons involved. The book is as much a portrait gallery and a piece of social and ecclesiastical history as it is a telling description of what the Church and nation owe to the team who made it.

Between the "lively" Mr Sydney Smith—wit, reformer and cathedral financier at the opening of the story—to the indomitable Canon Gregory, afterwards Dean, at the end, we come face to face with the personalities of the energetic Archdeacon Hale, the inventive Dean Milman, the eloquent Canon Liddon, the scholarly Lightfoot, the judicious Dean Church and the exuberant Scott Holland. Dr Prestige aptly points out that the complementary co-operation of the figures in the central part of the story, differing though these were in gifts and sometimes in church outlook, came from Mr. Gladstone's choice of four of them—a testimony to the value of a Prime Minister who could visualize the chapter body as a whole and is not content to inject any bright clergymen into an amorphous body.

Stainer's contribution to the musical excellence of St Paul's has a chapter to itself, and the ceremonies of Wellington's funeral are drawn in their monstrous impressiveness. The book brings out that informing all the mechanics of running a great church and glorifying its building was the pastoral task of equipping it for the religious edification of the public which attended its services or drifted in, and of the staff who operated its multifarious activities. But Dr Prestige

might have made more explicit that two features of the worship drew and held a firm nucleus of regular followers. One was the Sunday morning service which acted as a kind of Anglican norm by carrying out the intention of the Prayer Book, with Mattins followed by the Holy Communion sung, and sermon after the Nicene Creed. However unedifying the exodus of the multitude after the ante-Communion might be, it was a small price to pay for the value of having St Paul's setting the standard of Anglican worship, which is: Mattins as the *hors d'œuvre* before the principal course. A parish church may have to practise expediency and upset the Prayer Book structure by relegating the Holy Communion to a kind of *dessert* for the extra pious after the main dish, but there is no excuse for a cathedral's doing so.

The other characteristic feature during the period of Dr Prestige's survey was the regular preaching of the Canon in Residence on Sunday afternoons.

The surroundings of St Paul's are now again under review. They have seen changes before. One of them was at Smithfield, and this book refers to it: "Beside the spot where London used to burn its martyrs it now distributes frozen meat." But it is of what happened to the cathedral and inside it that Dr Prestige has given us this fine record as a labour of love, during his all too short tenure of the stall formerly occupied by Liddon, Newbolt and J. K. Mozley.

V. A. Demant.

Christ Church,
Oxford.

A History of Christianity. By K. S. Latourette. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 63s.

Professor Latourette, well known to all students of Church history by his serial *History of the Expansion of Christianity* in seven volumes and by other smaller works, has attempted the formidable task of compressing into a single volume the history of Christianity from the apostolic age until the present day. To be sure, a book of 1,477 pages of text, plus 39 pages of three-columned index (which is admirably done), is in itself a sufficiently impressive labour; and the author is to be congratulated warmly on the comprehensiveness, charity and clarity of his survey. His objective is to present "a well-rounded summary of the entire history of Christianity in all its phases and in its setting in the human scene". Each chapter, moreover, has a bibliography of recommended books for more detailed study; of which it may only be observed that Professor Latourette must have an omnivorous appetite plus a most retentive memory and a capacious commonplace book!

Indeed, as the reader accompanies his author on this long pilgrimage, "the wonder grows that one small head can carry all he knows". The proportions of the volume are such as might be anticipated from Dr Latourette's earlier studies. Thus the first five centuries of Christian history are compressed into half that number of pages; whilst

the century and a half since 1815 occupies 396 pages. It seems as if the author is the nearest approximation in modern times to the encyclopedic knowledge of the middle ages, and he would be a bold reader who challenged his omniscience. It follows from the scale and character of the enterprise, however, that specialists may be often dissatisfied with either the proportion of space given to their particular period or with some things contained and omitted therein. The book, indeed, will be most serviceable to students already possessed of a general acquaintance with the outlines of Christian history and of a more detailed knowledge of some special aspects or epoch. They will be able at once to appreciate the width and range of Professor Latourette's sweep and the careful choice of themes and subjects within their own particular field. The student who reads this study as his first introduction to the subject, however, is likely to feel more dismayed than instructed. Dr Latourette has not written a book for beginners; but has offered the fruits of his own ripe scholarship and teaching for the benefit of his fellow-teachers. For such a book, pressed down and running over with information and interpretation, they will be properly grateful. Particular tribute must be paid to the maps, for maps are generally the weakest side of Church histories; and Professor Latourette's contribution in this respect is outstandingly useful. None of us engaged in the study and teaching of Church history can read this volume without great profit and pleasure; few, indeed, of us could rival its knowledge and clarity; and all of us would be proud indeed to have written it. Whatever qualification or questioning or criticism we may offer here and there, we must remain deeply indebted to its author for the lucidity and charity of his thought. Nor may we be less grateful for the robust confidence of his conclusions and his optimism concerning the future of Christianity.

Norman Sykes.

Cambridge.

History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. By Étienne Gilson. Sheed and Ward. 42s.

It is a quarter of a century since M. Gilson first contributed an article to the controversy then raging in France—whether there was, or could be, such a thing as a "Christian Philosophy". It was widely argued that the very notion of a "Christian Philosophy" was inherently contradictory; for philosophy laid exclusive emphasis upon reason, whilst theology emphasized revelation. Therefore, so far as the alleged "Christian Philosophy" was Christian, it could not be philosophy, and so far as it was philosophy, it could not be Christian. All attempts to produce a fusion of the two lead to the elimination of one or other of them. Against this kind of outlook Gilson later argued that though there was no such thing as a "Christian reason", there was certainly a Christian use of reason. In the present work he defines "Christian philosophy" as the use made of philosophical

notions by Christian writers, and he traces that use for fourteen centuries, from Justin Martyr to Nicholas of Cusa.

A work in which reference is made to some 780 authors and 1,398 historians might well have become a mere catalogue of conflicts between rival philosophical factions. The author, however, has produced what he himself elsewhere calls a philosophical history of philosophy. He clearly shows which problems perplexed the thinkers of the Middle Ages, the type of solutions which they proposed; and the fate of those solutions at the hands of their successors. The text runs to 545 pages; there are 245 pages of bibliographies and notes; and there are two indexes, one of authors and one of historians. The text is divided into eleven parts, each of which deals with some significant phase of the history. Each part is prefaced by a short account of its significance, and the accounts of the major figures are usually concluded with a short but invaluable summary or judgment of their achievements or significance. Everywhere Gilson's unrivalled knowledge is evident—whether he is debunking shibboleths, tracing the history of a doctrine, or seeking its historical sources. From this treasure-house I will select two illustrations. First, it is popularly believed that the philosophy of the Middle Ages is concerned almost entirely with the problem of universals. Gilson's conclusion is that, on the contrary, "the problem of universals is a battlefield where the adversaries join battle only when provided with all their armaments. Conflicting metaphysics have tested their strength in trying to solve it, but they did not spring from the solutions which they proposed for it" (p. 98). Readers who are interested in this problem will find in Professor Aaron's *The Theory of Universals* (Oxford, 1952) an admirable continuation to date of Gilson's account, and, in addition, a penetrating analysis of the problem which helps to reveal both the merits and the weaknesses of medieval accounts of universals.

A second illustration is the clarity and precision with which Gilson distinguishes between Greek and Latin theology. The Latins were chiefly concerned with the problem of the relation of nature and grace; the Greeks were chiefly concerned with the problem of the restoration of the "image" of God in man. But centuries were to elapse before the language of Greek Theology was successfully translated into that of Latin Theology.

After reading this book the reviewer is left with two growing convictions. The first is the vastness of the region of Christian thinking throughout the ages which is virtually closed to the theologian who is devoid of all philosophy. The second is the great benefit which philosophers could derive from a study of the philosophical speculations of Christian thinkers. They will observe that many of the philosophical issues which have excited and perplexed this generation are not new, and a perusal of their earlier manifestations and subsequent fate would have contributed much to the appraisal of these issues. A typical example was the attempt by thinkers like Durand of Saint Pourçain, Peter Auriol and Henry of Harclay to solve metaphysical problems by the method of empirical verification.

This is a great book which is likely to remain a classic even when

some of its characteristic judgments will need to be revised in the light of further research. The usefulness of the work could, however, be increased tremendously by the inclusion of a subject index, for which, if necessary, one reviewer at least would sacrifice the index of historians.

RONALD TREE.

LAMPETER.

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN MODERN THEOLOGY. By James Brown.

NEW ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY. Edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre. The Library of Theology and Philosophy. S.C.M. Press. 18s. and 21s. respectively.

LIVING AND KNOWING. By E. W. F Tomlin. Faber and Faber 25s.

These three volumes, for all the differences between them, compose an interesting group: interesting because significant of a new concern for and with ideas. In this country, during the past twenty-five or thirty years, the domain of philosophy has shrunk and its dignity accordingly diminished. There has been, it would seem, a *trahison des clercs*—a paradoxical delight on the part of those paid to instruct the studious young in ways of wisdom long held to be the straightest and the highest that these in fact are not only misleading but for the most part imaginary. In the result we have been left with logic (much revised), observations on the theory of knowledge, and a somewhat renovated (but otherwise familiar) positivism. We may complain that we have asked for bread and have been given a stone. But the contemporary school coldly advises us that the provision of emotional nutriment is not its responsibility and that an "objective" reason, however tasteless, is best suited to an age that has had to discard so much of its surplus fat.

Yet we have but to cross the Channel to find a very different state of affairs. Logical positivism is there regarded (if at all) only as a typical product of Anglo-Saxon philistinism. Such purpose as it might have is merely ancillary—logical and philological; whereas philosophy has a larger vocation. Concern for ideas among Continental thinkers is indeed no less evident than in former and more tranquil days. Existentialism—French or German, theist or atheist, confident or despairing—although the first flush of its novelty has gone, still occupies much of the scene. But there are other creeds also: Marxism and Thomism, idealism, personalism and phenomenology—all very much alive and clamouring for the loyalty of the young intellectual; discordant certainly, but unfailingly exciting for those who cannot imagine life without the perennial challenge of *la pensée*. Moreover, the conviction still goes deep that philosophy is no mere *jeu d'esprit* but a serious business: that its aim is truth and wisdom and that its pursuit calls for devotion and the dedicated mind.

The three titles under review are in varying degree evidence that now among us also there is a recovered awareness of the spiritual

vocation of philosophy. This is in no small part a consequence of the influence of Kierkegaard, as of the current existentialism generally. Such influence is very apparent in Mr Brown's Croall Lectures, given at Edinburgh University in 1953. His theme is the modern rejection of the conventional epistemological disjunction of subject and object, and he undertakes in particular an examination of "certain trends in modern theology from the perspective viewpoint of the Subject-Object relation". These trends are represented by the work of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth, to each of whom Mr Brown devotes a careful and illuminating discussion. In the final chapter the author attempts to reach certain conclusions of his own. That there is a broad sense in which the subject must be held to modify the object of knowledge is "something near a truism"; but the idea must not be pushed too far. On the contrary, "the Objects which are 'made' or modified by the Subject . . . are not the 'objects' of the natural world . . . but those departments of existence which are Objects-in-relation-to-Subjects". We need to remind ourselves that not only can ideas and abstractions be objects of knowledge, but that experiences, psychological and even spiritual, can be objects of reflection and study. In other words, objectivity has its proper and essential claim, which knowledge, to be worthy of the name, cannot overlook. Nevertheless, the existentialist emphasis on subjectivity has its undoubted significance, since "the Objects or matters concerning which truth is asserted or may be known are simply not 'there' apart from the Subject's entering into its own sphere of discourse". If the object is not to engulf the subject "without the destruction of spirituality", neither may the subject be presumed to exhaust the object "without danger to the rooting of meaning in reality". The author's overall view is that the debate occasioned by the existentialist approach to truth is of serious philosophical value and may be hopefully continued.

The volume of essays and papers—twenty-two in all—edited by Professor Flew and Mr Macintyre introduces the reader to a much more variegated scene. His difficulty here indeed will be to take his bearings. Some of the authors are Christians, others are not. Logical positivism, Barthianism, existentialism, even *Entmythologisierung*, jostle each other in a lively cavalcade. Such unity as the book possesses is partly afforded, however, by the fact that all its contributors have in common, as the editors inform us, "a familiarity with and a great indebtedness to the recent revolution in philosophy". By this of course is meant the positivist revolution of a generation ago, referred to above. But to label them simply as logical positivists would, the editors insist, be "entirely inappropriate". It is not, moreover, altogether irrelevant to note that the Christian contributors are for the most part Anglicans, who thus provide one more testimony to the Anglican *flair* for picking up unusual (not to say compromising) acquaintance. If, then, *New Essays* should resemble a *στρωματόδεσμον* of odds and ends—for the bulk of the articles have already seen print in periodicals—some curious, provocative and amusing pieces are yet to be found, such as the opening dialogue—from the Antipodes—

with its characters of Barthian Protestant, Modernist Protestant (a figure of fun), Catholic, Logician and Psychoanalyst (a concession to science and sanity?) or that which follows, between Black and White on "Metaphysics, Logic and Theology", with its donnish conclusion —for we are privileged to listen through the key-hole of the S.C.R.— "You will be brought up sooner or later against some question of logic: some question of the sort that earlier on you felt inclined to say could not be of much importance for your students." Elsewhere, in an article on "Religion as the Inexpressible", we learn that positivistic philosophy has perhaps done a service to religion: "By showing in their own way the absurdity of what theologians try to utter, positivists have helped to suggest that religion belongs to the sphere of the unutterable." A salutary cold douche for the self-confident omniscience and irrepressible loquacity of theologians both ancient and modern? But of course, as the writer sapiently remarks, "there is more than one kind of nonsense".

Mr Tomlin's book is well written and therefore a pleasure to read. His manner is neither chatty nor brash nor pretentiously obscure. Nor is his point of view simply to be "placed" according to one or other of the current tendencies, schools or coteries. The author has thought for himself, and whilst avoiding eccentricity has achieved a refreshing independence of judgment. Somewhat rarely to-day, he believes in metaphysics; or, as he would himself perhaps prefer to put it, in meta*biology*, for when life and the Life that lies beyond it are divorced from one another, both are ultimately unintelligible. He thus also believes that philosophy has a spiritual end or purpose. Those to whom, as he tells us, his thinking is mainly indebted are Max Scheler, certain biologists like von Bertalanffy and Jean Rostand, the French philosopher Raymond Ruyer, the Russian Semyon Frank and the late Simone Weil—"that difficult thinker of whom one despairs and to whom one returns in despair".

"There are, it seems to me (he writes), three main courses open to the modern philosopher. Either he may content himself with sharpening his tools by 'analysis' and 'definition', or impatient of 'objectivity' he must go the way of the Existentialists (which means that he will probably turn into a publicist, or, if endowed with the required talent, a novelist or dramatist); or finally he must grapple with the problems raised—or perhaps neglected—by the scientists of his own time. For it seems to me that if the philosopher does not openly commune with the scientist, each will indulge in a dangerous self-communion." The two spheres of the "material" and the "spiritual" must be bridged; the present dichotomy of our experience is intolerable; and the positivist or naturalist solution is no solution at all. Hence we must pay the closest attention to the living organism and its functions, for life and consciousness are not merely connected but identical. The five successive parts of Mr Tomlin's treatise—which he does not claim to be systematic—are devoted respectively to man, consciousness, value and the supernatural (to which last term he gives his own and a rather questionable twist of meaning). His theological conclusion takes the form—surprisingly

to-day—of a doctrine of divine immanence. "A religion of pure transcendence implies, in popular language, a world wholly given over to the Devil. And we may find it difficult to understand why the God responsible for such surrender should, by entertaining second thoughts, wish to proceed to the salvage of his abandoned world." But he is aware that a doctrine of pure immanence is equally unsatisfactory. "No doctrine of Immanence is intelligible unless, in addition to explaining God's activity, it leaves something for man to do." But man is activity. "If, therefore, he is to continue to manifest his nature, his activity must somehow be analogous to that of God."

Mr Tomlin's reasoning, though carefully and consistently pursued, will challenge criticism at every turn. It is likely that he will please nobody who is not, to some extent, emancipated from the many competing dogmatisms which now hold sway. But the exercise of following his argument is by no means without its reward.

Bernard M. G. Reardon.

Kelly, Devon.

Treatise on Preaching. By Humbert of Romans. Translated by the Dominican Students of the Province of St Joseph and edited by Walter M. Conlon, O.P. Blackfriars. 12s. 6d.

This handy American translation of the First Book of the *De Eruditione Religiosorum Praedicatorum* by Humbert de Romans, fifth Dominican Master-General (d. 1277), has been undertaken for the laudable purpose of instructing modern Catholic clergy in the preacher's task. At the same time, it must be regretted that those members of a learned Order responsible for it have paid so little heed to modern standards of scholarly editing. In the first place, no hint is given in the brief editorial preface of the text or texts employed. A detective eye will note with suspicion that the subject of Humbert's anecdote from the *Vitae Patrum*[1] on page 89 is described as "the abbé Felix". But the decisive clue appears on page 104. Here a plaintive footnote informs the reader that "the seventh good effect of preaching [in the author's series of ten] is missing in the French translation"[2] and the gap is left, whereas a glance at the Latin original would have sufficed to fill it:

> "Septimus est augmentatio Corporis Christi mystici. Quia per praedicationem adiuncti sunt ei multi. Act. 2. et appositae sunt in die illa animae circiter tria millia, ad praedicationem Petri."

Are we to conclude that Dominican students of the Province of St Joseph are unable to read medieval Latin or borrow the requisite volume of Marguerin de la Bigne's *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum*

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[1] See Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, tom. LXXIII, col. 863.

[2] Presumably from Fr Berthier's edit., *Traité de l'instruction des prédicateurs*, Rome, 1910, as mentioned by Charland (not in the Brit. Museum or the Cambr. Univ. Library).

Patrum,[1] a post-Tridentine edition produced expressly to confute Protestant errors? Secondly, no reference is made anywhere to the authoritative study of medieval *Artes Praedicandi* by a learned fellow-Dominican in the same continent, Father Charland of Ottawa, which mentions this treatise and provides a short but useful bibliography of relevant literature[2] that should be more accessible to the seminarist than it is to the layman. As Humbert himself insists, *notandum est quod ad praedicatorem pertinet habere scientiam, cum habeat alios docere.* For the rest, however, we can be grateful for a fluent, dignified vernacular version of his tract, even if some may object to the rendering of *macellum* as "a grocery store" (p. 33), and such a phrase as "like he did to preaching" (p. 86) jars on English ears.

For the student of medieval homiletics Humbert's introduction lacks the interest of the more technical treatises and, indeed, of his own lengthier sequel of two hundred sermon schemes for every type of audience and special occasion.[3] Yet it is full of sound practical advice, supported at every stage by a wealth of scripture, often "according to the gloss" and correspondingly fantastical. By far the majority of its patristic quotations come from Gregory the Great, notably from his *Pastoral Care* and homilies: Bernard and Augustine follow with a mere dozen and ten respectively. Pagan literature supplies five sayings from Seneca, two from "the Philosopher" and one each from Horace and Cicero. Illustrative tales are few, brief and for the most part hoary:[4] Humbert's own views on the use of *exempla* in the pulpit can best be studied in abbé Welter's learned pages.[5] The real significance of his tractate lies, however, in its bold assertion that preaching is to be preferred to all other spiritual exercises. Christ, he argues, throughout his earthly life, celebrated Mass but once, is not said to have heard a single confession, rarely administered the Sacraments, never recited the Canonical Hours, and, during his ministry, spent more time in preaching than in prayer; likewise Paul and all the other apostles and disciples. With even greater emphasis, Ascension and Pentecost "show how much more pleasing to God is preaching than any other work": "Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel to every creature."

CAMBRIDGE. G. R. OWST.

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[1] Tom. XXV, pp. 426–56 (Lyons, 1677).
[2] P. 47 (Paris and Ottawa, 1936).
[3] Some account of the latter is given by Fr Antonin Danzas in *Études sur les temps primitifs de l'Ordre de S. Dominque* . . ., tome II, pp. 276–89.
[4] Exceptions are that of Pope Innocent III (pp. 34–5), a Cistercian turned Dominican (p. 83), and the Lenten jester, of unusual length (pp. 153–4).
[5] *L'Exemplum* . . ., pp. 70–74 (Paris and Toulouse, 1927).

SHORTER NOTICES

WINGS OF AN EAGLE. By G. Lacey May. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

Mr Lacey May has compiled an anthology of sixty extracts from the sermons of the Caroline preachers, beginning with Lancelot Andrewes and ending with Isaac Barrow. Well-known names such as John Donne, Jeremy Taylor and John Cosin find their place here, together with the lesser-known John Hales, Henry Hammond and Mark Frank. There is a most valuable introductory article on Caroline preaching and its characteristics, and each section is prefaced by a brief but helpful biographical note.

This is a useful book, bringing together some of the gems of 17th-century religious thought. But it raises a dilemma. No Caroline sermon, like no modern sermon, consists wholly of gems; neither must the merit of a sermon be judged by the few gems it contains. Its merit, as a sermon, depends much more on the construction and impact of the whole and on the development of the theme. That is something which an anthology of this kind can never reveal. Mr Lacey May hopes that the effect of his book will be to send readers to the sermons themselves. If it does this it will be valuable, but the reader ought to be warned that he must expect to approach his task with determination and concentration if he is not to be wearied with Andrewes' word-playing or lost in Jeremy Taylor's involved imagery. Is there perhaps room for a volume or series of volumes containing whole sermons, suitably edited and modernized for the modern reader? But then they would no longer be Caroline sermons!

On p. 19 the title of Donne's book should be *The Pseudo-Martyr*. There is also an inaccurate statement in the first sentence on p. 1. Cartwright left Cambridge shortly after Andrewes entered Pembroke Hall as an undergraduate, and there is no evidence that Andrewes ever engaged in controversy with him.

PAUL A. WELSBY.

COPDOCK.

CHRISTINA ROSSETTI. Her life and religion. By Margaret Sawtell. Mowbray. 10s. 6d.

MISS MITFORD AND MR HARNESS. Records of a friendship. By Caroline M. Duncan-Jones. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

The first work of any length on Christina Rossetti for twenty-five years, Margaret Sawtell's study is explicitly limited to her life and religion and does not pretend to be literary criticism: "the chief aim of this work is to distil Christina's religious thought and development and its influence on her character and actions, out of her printed works, the testimony of friends, and the background of day-

to-day events of her life." We must not, therefore, be disappointed when we find all too rarely any help in enjoying the poems as poems and all too frequently no more exact valuation of them than the devoted exclamations "lovely", or "very perfect", or "exquisite".

With regard to her religious development it is maintained that, "unremittingly through all the years the love of the Divine Lover had overshadowed her" and, whereas this poet has been sometimes accused of morbidly torturing herself, she is here presented as growing in the love of God through the renunciation, for example, of two men she loved—when she was nineteen or twenty, of James Collinson, the pre-Raphaelite painter, who, to complicate matters, vacillated between membership of the Church of Rome and the Church of England, at one time contemplated becoming a Jesuit and eventually married another woman; and, when she was thirty-six, of Charles Cayley, a translator of Dante and "a rare model of a retiring simple-minded scholar", but not a Christian. Her desire for Cayley continued and she endured a pendulum of feeling which, this study suggests, precipitated Graves disease in one who was rarely well, at a time when her brother, Dante Gabriel, had begun to drug his overstrung nerves with chloral and her sister, Maria, was about to become a nun.

There is bound to be considerable speculation about her "hushed life-drama", as her brother William called it in a Memoir, because she was, even with him, "extremely reticent in all matters in which her affections were deeply engaged". But her brother gives us some details of her religious position of which this study might have made more. That "Christ is God" was, for example, the core of her faith and its reasonableness irrelevant, and, suffering "an awful sense of unworthiness", her one serious flaw was that "she was by far overscrupulous".

It is unfortunate that Margaret Sawtell's English is sometimes wanting, but it is perhaps because it would have made her study too long that she has not, for example, gone far into the effect of the "High Church" movement on this poet and told us more about her spiritual director, Dr Littledale, and about the local church to which she belonged, and that she has not explored more systematically Miss Rossetti's beliefs and attitudes and the characteristics of her devotion.

The sub-title of Mrs Duncan-Jones's book—"Records of a friendship"—is typically unassuming. The friends are the heroic Miss Mary Mitford, conversationalist and letter-writer, who, to provide for her family, composed such sketches of country life as *Our Village*, and the Reverend William Harness, sometime friend of Byron, acquaintance of all the great literary men of his day, editor of Shakespeare, popular preacher, first parish priest of new churches in the developing London suburbs of St Pancras and Knightsbridge, enthusiastic, kind, and, in the words of Thackeray's daughter, "in touch with so much that was interesting and romantic, and in heart with so much that suffered". Mrs Duncan-Jones uses unpublished letters and

diaries and lets her sources speak for themselves, as does the reply to the question of William Harness's great-niece, "Did Uncle William do much parish work?" "Why, yes, my dear; he dined out enormously."

University of Liverpool. R. T. Davies.

Studies in Biblical Archeology. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d. each.

The first three volumes written by the distinguished French archeologist André Parrot have now appeared. The first, *Discovering Buried Worlds* (120 pp.), is a general discussion of archeology, and its implications for the Bible, which has little to add to Woolley's *Digging Up the Past* and Seton Lloyd's *Foundations in the Dust*, for example. But the second and third (*The Flood and Noah's Ark*, 75 pp., and *The Tower of Babel*, 75 pp.) bring together very compactly a good deal of scattered information, and many who cannot find time to read the larger and more detailed works will be glad to have these compact monographs. They are well illustrated.

Providence and Suffering in the Old and New Testaments. By E. F. Sutcliffe, S.J. Nelson. 15s.

Professor Sutcliffe first attempts a brief world-survey of his subject, giving rather more consideration to the opinions of the "Babylonians" as he terms the ancient Mesopotamians in general, and then he turns more specifically to the Biblical teaching. To deal so swiftly with Hinduism, Buddhism, Kabbalistic Judaism and Zoroastrianism, besides a slightly fuller treatment of Egyptian, Greek and Roman views on the subject, all in the space of 16 pages, cannot be said to be a very helpful or successful procedure, but the treatment of "Babylonia" in a separate chapter is more adequate. The Adam and Eve myth (the historicity of which is assumed but never asserted) is viewed as an aetiology of suffering, and the principle of solidarity is invoked to explain the prevalence of suffering in the world at large. Whether there is an area of human suffering of which man's sin is not the efficient cause, is not faced, but it is said that "the origin of all the hardship and the misery in the world is explained in Genesis". Two distinct points arise: first, whether the myth was ever intended to explain the origin of all suffering is questionable; secondly, whether Professor Sutcliffe himself accepts the myth as an adequate explanation of all suffering, or is merely contenting himself with an exposition of the teaching of the myth, is not clear. On the second point, a hasty reader would assume the former alternative. Certainly, those brought up on N. P. Williams will not feel that any great contribution has been made to the discussion. The rest of the book is a good account of the development of Biblical teaching, which covers the ground adequately but without doing much more than honestly present the Biblical teaching. The chapter on "Suffering in the light of the Future Life" is interesting, and able in its treatment of Maccabees

and Wisdom, but surprisingly Dan. 12 and Isa. 24–27 gain no mention. The New Testament chapter is largely confined to the mystical sharing of Christ's sufferings, to martyrdom, and to fasting as of Christian obligation (another reminder that the New Testament is the completion of and not the substitute for the Old Testament). Professor Sutcliffe's main contention in the recapitulation is that a theology which does not give a proper place to the Christian hope of heaven is one which cannot have an adequate answer to the problem of suffering. We must be very grateful to him for saying that so clearly. Further, it is of very great interest to find a Roman Catholic scholar so intent on finding out what it is the Scriptures teach. By the work of men like Professor Sutcliffe and Père Gelin another important bridge is being built whereby the sundered halves of Christendom may be able to meet more often, and speak each other's language more fluently.

S. B. Frost.

Didsbury College.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

Abingdon Press: *The Interpreter's Bible.* Vol. 5: Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Isaiah, Jeremiah ($8.75).

Berean Press: William Robinson, *A Companion to the Communion Service* [a devotional manual based on the Reformed tradition: foreword by Nathaniel Micklem] (5s.).

Cambridge University Press: J. C. Dickinson, *The Shrine of our Lady of Walsingham* (18s.); K. Ingham, *Reformers in India* (18s.).

Hamish Hamilton: Phyllis Garlick, *Six Great Missionaries* [short biographies of St Francis Xavier, John Wesley, Alexander Mackay, Sir Wilfred Grenfell, Ida S. Scudder, and Albert Schweitzer] (10s. 6d.).

Longmans: Harry N. Hancock, *Red Letter Days* [a series of meditations] (8s. 6d.).

Lutterworth Press: Bertram Lee Woolf (Trans.), *Reformation Writings of Martin Luther:* Vol. II, *The Spirit of the Protestant Reformation* (31s. 6d.); Lakshmibai Tilak, *From Brahma to Christ* (2s. 6d.); John Foster, *Beginning from Jerusalem* (2s. 6d.).

Mowbray: *Christ and the Christian* (3s.); The author of "The Way", *St Mary Magdalene at the Sepulchre* [a retreat for private use] (2s. 6d.); James Wareham, *True Repentance* (4s. 6d.).

Nisbet: T. H. Croxall, *Meditations from Kierkegaard* (12s. 6d.); T. H. Croxall, *Kierkegaard Commentary* (25s.).

Religious Education Press: E. P. Dickie, *A Safe Stronghold* (5s.).

S.C.M. Press: Ludwig Köhler, *Hebrew Man* (12s. 6d.); A. R. Vidler, *Christian Belief and this World* (12s. 6d.); Henri Metzger, *St Paul's Journeys in the Greek Orient* (8s. 6d.); André Parrot, *Nineveh and the Old Testament* (8s. 6d.); Martin Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (25s.).

S.P.C.K.: Arthur J. Fielder, *Healing your Body* (1s.).

Tyndale Press: J. Oswald Sanders and J. Stafford Wright, *Some Modern Religions* (2s.).

United Society for Christian Literature: J. T. Munday, *Witchcraft in Central Africa and Europe* (3s. 6d.).

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The examination of John Colet's writings and letters is undertaken to portray the mind and character of a man who, as Dean of St Paul's, founder of a well-known school, and a leader of the Revival of Learning is justly famous, yet as a person little known.

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George Every, S.S.M. **30s. net**

A clear division between the High Church and Low Church parties only emerged in 1689. Subsequent events hardened the differences and gave bitterness to resulting controversies. The author traces the relation of these controversies to the rise of Methodism, and to the beginnings of the Evangelical and Oxford Movements.

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